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American corporations earn a large and growing volume of  after-tax profits 
through their  affiliated foreign  companies. The  foreign  earnings of  U.S. 
corporations  are  typically  subject  to  taxation  both  by  host  foreign 
governments and by the U.S. government, an arrangement that dramatically 
complicates  the  companies’  tax  returns  and  the  consequences of  their 
international  financial  transactions.  Under  these  circumstances,  obvious 
questions arise about the extent to which the system of international taxation 
affects the behavior of multinational corporations. 
This  paper  analyzes  the  financial  flows  from  foreign  subsidiaries of 
American  multinational  corporations to  their  parent  corporations in  the 
United States. These flows represent one method by  which  foreign earn- 
ings  of  American  companies  are  returned  (“repatriated”)  to  American 
investors. Their size generally reflects the  size of  American investments 
overseas: in  1984, the last year for which data are available, the controlled 
foreign  corporations of  American  multinationals  earned  after-foreign-tax 
profits of $30 billion, of which they repatriated $1 1.8 billion in dividends to 
their American parent companies.  These repatriations are of  importance not 
only to U.S. investors, who thereby have access to those funds, but also to 
the  U.S.  government, which  generally  does  not  tax  foreign  earnings of 
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controlled foreign corporations until  they are repatriated.  It is precisely  the 
effect on repatriation behavior of this deferred taxation that we examine. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In section 5.1, we review  the current 
tax  system as applied to multinational  firms and consider  the  incentives  it 
creates for various intrafirm financial transactions (and, in particular, forms 
of  repatriations).  We  summarize  in  section  5.2 repatriation  patterns  from 
aggregate time-series data on the overseas operations of U.S. multinationals. 
Our principal findings appear in section 5.3, in which we explore directly the 
determinants  of  distributions  by  foreign  subsidiaries  to  their  U.S.  parent 
corporations,  using  new  micro  data  on  12,041 controlled  foreign  corpora- 
tions (and their 453 U.S. parents) collected from tax returns for 1984. This 
source exposes variations in distribution patterns not detectable in aggregate 
data. In particular, we find that most subsidiaries paid no dividends at all to 
their parents and that the U.S. tax  system  collected  very  little revenue  on 
their  foreign  income  while  distorting their  internal  financial  transactions. 
Conclusions  and  some  implications  for  U.S.  corporate  tax  reform  are 
presented  in section 5.4. 
5.1  The Tax System and Its Incentives 
5.1.1  The System 
The  United  States  claims  tax  authority  over  all  persons  resident  in 
America,  meaning that American individuals and corporations must pay tax 
to the U.S. government  on all their income, whether earned  in the United 
States  or  abroad.  “Residence”  is  not  the  only  possible  criterion  for  tax 
authority,  and  a  number  of  European  countries  tax  their  residents  on  a 
“temtorial”  basis, on which only that income earned  within  the country’s 
borders is subject to tax.’  The American  “residence”  system is arguably a 
more  common  practice  and  is  used  by  other  important capital-exporting 
countries such as the United Kingdom and Japan. Hence, an understanding 
of the international effects  of residence  taxation by  the United  States may 
shed light on the effects of  international taxation throughout the world. 
In addition  to their U.S. tax liabilities,  American  multinational  corpora- 
tions  usually  owe taxes  to  foreign  governments  on profits  earned  locally 
within  their  borders.  In  order  not  to  subject  Americans  earning  income 
abroad  to  double  taxation,  U.S. tax  law  provides  a  foreign  tax  credit  for 
income taxes (and related taxes) paid  to foreign governments.  Thus, in the 
simplest  possible  situation,  a  U.S.  corporation  earning  $100 in a  foreign 
country with a 10 percent tax rate (and a foreign tax obligation of $10) pays 
only $24 to the U.S. government  since its U.S. corporate tax obligation of 
$34 (34 percent of $100) is reduced to $24 by the foreign tax credit of $10. 
The foreign tax  credit is, however,  limited to U.S. tax liability  on foreign 
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firm pays $50 to the foreign government, but its U.S. foreign tax credit is 
limited to $34. Hence,  a U.S.  firm receives full tax credits for its foreign 
taxes paid only when  it is in a “deficit credit”  position, that  is,  when  its 
average foreign tax rate is less than its tax rate on domestic operations. A 
firm has “excess credits”  if its available foreign tax credits exceed U.S. tax 
liability  on  its  foreign  income.  Since  1976,  the  law  requires  American 
companies to calculate their foreign tax credits on a worldwide basis, so that 
all  foreign  income  and  foreign  taxes  paid  are  added  together  in  the 
computation of  the foreign tax credit limit. Furthermore, income is broken 
into different functional “baskets”  in  the calculation of  applicable credits 
and  limit^.^ 
Deferral of U.S. taxation of certain foreign earnings is another important 
feature of  the U.S. international tax system. This deferral takes two forms. 
The first is very common in income tax systems: unrealized capital gains are 
usually ~ntaxed.~  The second is that earnings of foreign subsidiaries of  U.S. 
corporations  are  not  subject  to  U.S.  taxation  until  repatriated  to  their 
American  parent  corporations.  This  type  of  deferral  is  available  only  to 
foreign  operations  that  are  separately  incorporated  in  foreign  countries 
(“subsidiaries”  of  the  parent)  and  not  to  consolidated  (“branch”) 
operations.’  Multinationals generally  can  choose  the  legal  form  of  their 
foreign operations,  and  this choice can affect their tax  obligations. Parent 
U.S.  firms are generally taxed  on  their subsidiaries’ foreign income only 
when repatriated and receive “indirect”  foreign tax credits (“deemed-paid 
credits”)  for  foreign  income  taxes  paid  (by  the  subsidiaries) on  income 
subsequently received  as  dividends.  The  U.S.  government  taxes  branch 
profits as they are earned, just as it would profits earned within the United 
States. On the other hand, organizing as a branch offers to the investor the 
possibility of  deducting from U.S.  income foreign branch losses and  may 
involve (in some cases) more lenient foreign regulations. 
The deferral of U.S. taxation creates an incentive for firms to delay paying 
dividends  from  their  subsidiaries  to  their  American  parents.  In  1962, 
Congress enacted  the  Subpart  F  provisions  in  part  to  prevent  indefinite 
deferral of  U.S. tax  liability on income earned abroad that  is continually 
reinvested merely in order to escape U.S.  taxes.  Subpart F rules apply to 
controlled  foreign  corporations  (CFCs),  which  are  foreign  corporations 
owned at least 50 percent by U.S.  persons holding stakes of at least 10 percent 
each.  The  Subpart F rules  include provisions  that  treat  passive  income, 
and income invested in U.S. property, as if  that income were distributed to 
the  U.S.  parent  company,  so  it  is  subject  to  immediate  U.S. taxation. 
Controlled foreign corporations that reinvest their earnings in active foreign 
businesses avoid the Subpart F restrictions and can continue to defer U.S. tax 
liability on those  earnings.  The Tax  Reform Act  of  1986 further expands 
the coverage of  Subpart F and  also makes currently taxable in the United 
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companies that  do not  qualify as CFCs because they  do not  meet  the 50 
percent ownership rule. 
“Dividends”  to  the  parent  are  not  the  only  form  of  repatriation. 
“Interest”  paid to the parent to service debt capital contributions usually has 
the additional tax feature of  deductibility in the host country. Astute use of 
transfer pricing can allow the subsidiary to shift earnings to the parent or  to 
other  subsidiaries of  the parent  having  more  advantageous tax  treatment; 
royalty  payments  to  the  parent  can  serve  a  similar  function.  Foreign 
governments often  impose  moderate  taxes  on  interest,  rent,  and  royalty 
payments from foreign affiliates to their American parents; these withholding 
taxes are fully creditable against foreign tax liabilities of  the U.S. taxpayer. 
We  return to a comparison of various repatriation channels later. 
5.1.2  Taxes and the Repatriation Decision 
At  the core of  our concern is the effect of the tax rules just described on 
firms’ repatriation decisions. Consider first the tax cost of dividends (0)  paid 
from a foreign subsidiary to its American parent. Assume that the foreign 
country  uses  a  classical  corporate  income  tax  system  and  imposes  no 
withholding taxes on dividends. Then the dividend payment does not change 
the foreign tax liability of the firm, but it does produce a U.S. tax liability of 
(D  + FTC)  T -  FTC, where T is the U.S. tax rate and FTC the foreign tax 
credit generated by  the dividend payment. For  parent corporations that do 
not have excess foreign tax credits and their subsidiaries that pay dividends 
out of current earnings, the foreign tax credit is T*E*D/[(  1 -  ?*)E*],  where 
T*  is the foreign tax rate and E* is the subsidiary’s foreign earnings. Hence, 
the dividend payment obliges the U.  S . parent to pay net U.  S . taxes of 
(1)  D(7 -  ?*)/(1 -  T*), 
and the parent keeps a net dividend of 
D(l -  7)/(1-  T*). 
Significant withholding taxes  imposed by  foreign  governments offer  a 
complication,  especially  for  firms  in  excess  credit  positions.  For  U.S. 
parents with deficit credits, the payment of a dividend increases their foreign 
tax liability by  the withholding tax on the dividend, but their American tax 
liability is reduced by  an equal amount through the foreign tax credit. For 
U.S. parents in excess credit positions, subsidiary dividend payments trigger 
withholding tax liabilities with no corresponding reduction in U.S. taxes; in 
that case, dividends raise total worldwide tax burdens. 
Abstracting  for  the  moment  from  considerations  of  transfer  pricing, 
alternative repatriation strategies include payments to the parent of  interest, 
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Since foreign corporate tax rates are generally much higher than withholding 
tax rates,7 the foreign tax saving offered by  deducting repatriations in those 
forms  well  outweighs  the  cost  of  withholding  tax  liabilities.  Hence,  a 
tax-minimizing firm with excess foreign tax credits should seek to maximize 
those repatriations. 
5.1.3  U.S. Tax Law and the “Dividend Puzzle” 
Given the structure of U.S. taxation of multinationals, one might question 
whether domestic tax revenue is likely to be collected. For example, given 
the credit for foreign taxes paid, if foreign tax rates are high relative to U.S. 
tax rates, much if  not all of  the U.S. tax liability on this income would be 
eliminated. However, historically (prior to passage of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986), foreign tax rates have been lower than the U.S.  statutory corporate 
income tax rate. 
Dividends are paid  to  U.S.  parents.  As  we  describe in  more  detail in 
section  5.2,  the  controlled  foreign  corporations  of  U.  S.  multinationals 
repatriate more than one-third and as much as 60 percent of  their foreign 
earnings each year as dividends. The  “dividend  puzzle”  is the following: 
why do they pay dividends, given that dividends are often the least favorable 
(from a tax  standpoint) means  of  repatriating earnings? The  same puzzle 
arises  in  the  analysis  of  dividend  payouts  of  domestic  firms  to  their 
stockholders,  and  analyses  of  the  domestic  puzzle  suggest three  general 
approaches to this question. 
The first view  is based on the “trapped  equity”  or “tax  capitalization” 
model of corporate dividends associated with King (1977), Auerbach (1979), 
and  Bradford (1981)8 and  applied  by  Hartman  (1985) to  the  analysis of 
foreign  dividends  received  by  multinationals.  Suppose  that  a  parent 
capitalizes  a  wholly  owned  subsidiary  with  an  initial  transfer  of  equity 
capital.  When  the  subsidiary  has  growth  opportunities  and  desired 
investment exceeds internally generated funds, the parent transfers additional 
funds to  it.  For  a  mature subsidiary, equity  is  trapped-earnings  exceed 
profitable  investment  opportunities,  and  the  subsidiary  repatriates  the 
residual funds. Costly repatriations can be delayed as long as the subsidiary 
has active investment opportunities abroad, but, once these are exhausted, 
the Subpart F rules prevent the use of passive investments to defer U.S. tax 
obligations. In the trapped equity view, dividend payouts are unaffected by 
(permanent) changes in their tax price; they respond only to characteristics of 
the subsidiary, in particular, the difference between its internally generated 
funds and its profitable investment opportunities. The characteristics of  the 
parent firm and other subsidiaries are irrelevant. 
A  second view  corresponds to  the  notion  that  a  multinational chooses 
financial policy in its subsidiaries in order to minimize the firm’s global tax 
liability. The most preferred tool is transfer pricing across affiliates to locate 
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from  subsidiaries  is  compensation  for  technology  transferred  via  direct 
investment-for  example, royalties and license fees. There is scope for tax 
minimization through strategies that trade off royalties for dividends. Kopits 
(1976) illustrates this point by showing that the tax-minimizing royalty is at 
least as large as the tax shelter provided by any excess credits from dividends 
(properly adjusted). 
Tax-minimization schemes encounter two stumbling blocks.  The first is 
external: governments are understandably unenthusiastic about such behavior 
by  multinationals  and  generally  limit  firms’  discretion  over  pricing  and 
financial decisions. Sales of goods between multinationals and their affiliates 
are generally  required  to take place at market,  or “arm’s  length,”  prices, 
though in practice  this requirement may be difficult to enforce.’  Similarly, 
many countries limit multinationals  to using arm’s length interest rates and 
have formula restrictions on rent and royalty payments. As a consequence, 
even tax-minimizing  firms may  be  unable  to use  nondividend  methods  to 
repatriate  foreign  earnings. lo The  second  difficulty  that  tax-minimization 
encounters is that, for reasons of corporate control, the parent may prefer to 
evaluate  the  subsidiary  as  an  independent  profit  center;  this  point  is 
developed below. 
In addition to altering the form of payment across repatriation mechanisms 
at a given point  in time,  global tax-minimization  strategies  alter the time- 
series patterns  of  dividend  repatriations  as  well.  For  example,  increased 
dividend payments from subsidiaries during a period in which the parent is 
making losses at home reduces future tax liabilities. Global tax-minimization 
behavior is distinguished  from ‘‘trapped equity”  behavior in that subsidiar- 
ies’ distribution patterns depend not only on their own tax prices but also on 
their tax prices relative to those for other subsidiaries of the same parent. In 
addition, parent  characteristics  are relevant  to global  tax minimization. To 
the extent that subsidiaries can, at the margin, alter the composition of  their 
distributions  among  royalties,  interest,  and  dividends,  then  whether  their 
parents  are  in  excess  credit  positions-or,  alternatively,  losing  money 
domestically-will  be important factors in dividend decisions. 
A third general view suggests that dividend repatriations are “valued”  by 
the parent.  That is, the parent  desires a particular pattern  of repatriations, 
and tax authorities have effectively forestalled clever use of royalty payments 
and transfer pricing at the margin. Alternatively, the parent values dividend 
distributions  per  se.  In  the  literature  on  domestic  dividend  distributions, 
models with asymmetric information between firm “insiders”  and “outsid- 
ers”  (in  the  domestic  case,  “management”  and  “shareholders,”  respec- 
tively) figure prominently. Signaling models (see, e.g., Bhattacharya  1979) 
emphasize that dividend payments convey information about the profitability 
of the firm; such signals-valuable  because of the private information-are 
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private  information  about  capital  investment  projects  is  an  important 
problem  in  majority-owned  or  wholly  owned  affiliates  of  U.S.  multi- 
nationals.” 
An  alternative  information  problem  stresses  “agency  cost”  consid- 
erations.  l3 For example, absent substantial equity interest in the venture by  a 
subsidiary’s  managers-or,  alternatively,  compensation  tied  closely  to 
subsidiary profits-subsidiary  managers may  be  tempted  to raise costs by 
investing funds intended for  ‘‘soft capital”  expenditures (such as  organ- 
izational  expenditures  or  maintenance)  in  perquisites  or  projects  for 
personal  gain.  Such soft capital expenditures are much  harder to observe 
and monitor than spending on “hard  capital”  (capital investment projects). 
Monitoring is additionally complicated by differences in local language and 
custom,  the  possible  involvement of  host  country  nationals  (or  the  host 
country government) with  conflicting objectives,  and  so on.  The optimal 
contract in  such a  setting will  have less  variable payments  across project 
outcomes than would prevail under symmetric information (see the formal 
model in  Gertler  and  Hubbard  1988). To  the extent that  direct ownership 
stakes by  subsidiary managers are limited,  incentive-compatible financing 
arrangements will necessarily mitigate the use of  tax-minimizing  strategies 
that artificially lower the subsidiary’s accounting profits. 
Such concerns have been expressed in the management literature as well. 
The use of complicated schemes for tax avoidance by shuffling profits among 
subsidiaries has been observed to be mitigated by  high administrative costs 
and the increased difficulty in monitoring managerial performance. The need 
for internal accounting systems to monitor managerial decision making has 
been  emphasized by  Brooke and  Remmers  (1970) and Greene and Duerr 
(1970) and in survey evidence for U.S. firms by  Bums (1980) and for U.S. 
and Japanese firms by Tang (1979, chap. 6). 
5.1.4  Previous Studies of Dividend Repatriation Patterns 
Empirical  evidence  on  the  determinants  of  multinational  dividend 
repatriations and of the importance of tax considerations has been mixed, in 
part because of  problems of data availability. In an early study, Barlow and 
Wender  (1955)  hypothesized  that  a  multinational  would  make  an  initial 
infusion of  capital and reinvest the earnings in the hope of  a large ultimate 
realization. Such a pattern was not consistent with early empirical evidence, 
however. Stevens (1969) documented the importance of continuing infusions 
of  capital  by  parents  to  established  subsidiaries;  additional  evidence  of 
continuing external  finance  was  provided  by  Stevens  (1972)  and  Severn 
(1972). The  issue of  adjustment  of  dividend  repatriations to  changes  in 
profitability was addressed by  Mauer and Scaperlanda (1972), who worked 
within  the  framework  of  Lintner’s  (1956)  partial  adjustment  model  of 
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subsidiary  dividend  payments  to  earnings  changes  than  had  comparable 
studies for domestic (U.S.) firm payouts to shareholders; tax effects were not 
considered. 
Perhaps the first systematic evidence incorporating tax effects is found in 
Kopits’s (1972) study of  1962 data on U.S. subsidiary repatriations from a 
set of selected countries. Kopits finds that ‘‘mature subsidiaries” (those with 
low  growth  of  desired  capital  stock)  have  higher  payout  ratios,  ceteris 
paribus,  than  do  subsidiaries with  more  rapidly  growing  desired  capital 
stocks. However, he also finds important “tax price”  effects, especially in 
countries with separate taxes on undistributed profits.  l4 
Additional evidence against the view that dividends are only a residual has 
accumulated. Zenoff’s  (1966) survey of  repatriation patterns  within  U.S. 
multinationals found that firms with “young”  subsidiaries varied remittance 
patterns  according  to  the  subsidiaries’ needs  for  funds  while  remittance 
patterns of  “established”  subsidiaries were set according to rules of thumb 
(see  also  Brooke  and  Remmers  1970,  chap.  6).  Using  a  sample  of 
majority-owned  affiliates  of  U.S.  multinationals in  1977 and  1982,  Jun 
(  1987) finds that roughly 25 percent simultaneously repatriated dividends to 
their American parents and received from them new capital infusions. This 
fact not only seems to belie the trapped equity view of dividends but throws 
into question the skill of U.S. multinationals in avoiding taxes since two-way 
flows of  funds between the U.S. parent and its more lightly taxed foreign 
subsidiary  are always  tax  disadvantaged. Finally, Hines (1988b) observes 
that,  even  within  the  Hartman  framework,  particular  features  of  the 
calculation of  the indirect foreign tax credit should make dividend payouts 
(and  subsidiary reinvestment decisions)  sensitive to  the  tax  and  financial 
position of other subsidiaries; evidence for 1982 is consistent with important 
effects of  these features. 
Mutti (1981) analyzed repatriation patterns in  data drawn from  a large 
cross section of  subsidiaries operating in eleven foreign countries in  1977. 
Dividends  were  the  dominant  form  of  repatriation  in  seven  countries, 
including West Germany, which has an undistributed profits tax on corporate 
earnings. He finds a very low rank correlation coefficient between tax cost 
proxies  and  the  relative role  of  dividends in  total repatriations. When  he 
controlled  for  industry  effects,  tax  considerations  appeared  important. 
Dividend payments relative to earnings were negatively related to levels of 
interest and royalty payments (treated as predetermined in Mutti’s estimating 
equation). 
A  number  of  studies  of  tax  determinants  of  aggregate  foreign  direct 
investment also bear  on  the repatriation decisions of  U.S. multinationals. 
Hartman (1981) and Boskin and Gale (1987) find the level of  foreign direct 
investment out of  retained earnings to be  sensitive to rates of  return and 
relative tax rates in  the United  States and  abroad.  The corollary of  their 
finding  is  that  repatriations  are  also  sensitive  to  relative  taxes.  Newlon 169  Dividend Repatriations by U.S.  Multinationals 
(1987) broadly confirms their results,  using adjusted data and a variety of 
econometric specifications. 
5.2  Aggregate Repatriation Behavior 
This  section  examines  the  pattern  of  aggregate  repatriations  by  U.S. 
multinationals  over  the  period  1962-82.15  As  illustrated  in  table  5.1, 
payouts from  after-tax earnings  are  substantial,  ranging for  all  industries 
from 21 percent in  1982 to 47 percent in 1962. The calculated payout rates 
are in  line with  those of  U.S.  domestic corporations reported  in  Poterba 
(1987).16  Dividend  payout  rates  are  slightly  higher  for  subsidiaries  in 
manufacturing industries. Within  manufacturing, there is  significant varia- 
tion across major industry groups-with,  for example, high payout rates for 
motor vehicles (payouts exceeding current earnings in recession years) and 
low  payouts  in  electronic  equipment.  Corresponding  dollar  volumes  of 
dividends  paid  are  reported  in  table  5.2.  As  table  5.2  indicates,  the 
manufacturing industries account for by  far the majority  of  the dividends 
received by  U.S. multinational corporations each year. 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 report CFC dividends by  country of  their incorpora- 
tion.  The  summary data in table 5.3 do not  indicate a  strong geographic 
pattern in dividend payout rates,  suggesting that any effects that taxes may 
have  on  dividend  distributions  are  likely  to  be  operating  through  the 
particular  circumstances of  individual companies  rather  than  a  country’s 
statutory tax rate on corporations. Table 5.4 exhibits dividend payout levels 
by  country,  illustrating  the  continuing  importance  of  U.S.  multinational 
operations in Canada, the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Brazil, 
Mexico, and the Netherlands. 
As noted earlier, dividends are not the only method by which a subsidiary 
can repatriate funds to its American parent. As shown in table 5.5, interest, 
rent, and royalty distributions are important as well. In the years for which 
separate data on the distributions are available, interest, rents, and royalties 
account for 43 percent of the (sum of  the) distributions in 1976, 31 percent 
in  1974, 30 percent in  1972, and 39 percent in  1968. Here again, there is 
substantial variation across major industry categories,  with  interest, rents, 
and royalties virtually nonexistent in trade and very  important in services. 
Within  manufacturing,  motor  vehicles-an  industry  with  relatively  high 
dividend  payouts-distributed  little  in  the  form  of  interest,  rents,  and 
royalties, while nonelectrical machinery relied more heavily on nondividend 
distributions. 
Even apart from considerations of  transfer pricing, focusing on dividend 
distributions from subsidiaries to parents directly may  seriously underesti- 
mate  total  payments.  In  particular,  dividends  are  often  distributed  to 
domestic subsidiaries of  the U.S.  parent company or distributed to another 
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of  these indirect distributions  for selected years  in which detailed data are 
available.  In  1976  and  1982,  for  example,  more  dividends  were  paid 
indirectly  to the parent than directly. In other years for which relevant data 
are available,  direct  payments  are  only  about  two-thirds  of  total  dividend 
distributions. 
In table 5.7, we reevaluate the magnitudes of dividend distributions  (out 
of after-tax and also out of pre-tax current earnings) for selected years. The 
payout ratios reported  in table 5.7 represent  distributions  made directly  to 
the U.S. parent  and to other U.S (domestic) corporations controlled by the 
parent. These payout ratios still understate total dividend distributions in the 
years  reported  since payments  to other subsidiaries of  the  same parent  are 
not  included.  Nonetheless,  the  payout  ratios  are  quite  high, exceeding  40 
percent for all industries in most years (based on after-tax earnings); payouts 
are  higher  in  manufacturing  industries  than  average  payouts  for  all 
industries.  The payout  rates  reported in table  5.7 are substantially  higher 
than those for domestic U.S. corporations noted previously in table 5.1. 
As described in section 5.1, distributing dividends is not the only way in 
which  CFCs  can generate  U.S. tax  liabilities  with  their  after-tax  foreign 
earnings; CFCs are subject to the Subpart F rules that treat certain types of 
passive income and also foreign earnings reinvested in the United States as 
“deemed  distributed”  to  American  parents  and  hence  currently  taxable. 
Table 5.8 documents a dramatic rise in the level of Subpart F income over 
recent years.17 Subpart F income rose from $60 million in 1968 (equal to 3 
percent  of  actual dividend  distributions  [from table  5.71 that year) to $4.5 
billion  in  1982 (43 percent  of  actual dividends).  Manufacturing  industries 
accounted for the bulk of Subpart F income over this period, particularly the 
CFCs  in  petroleum,  chemicals,  nonelectrical  machinery,  and  electronic 
equipment  industries;  motor  vehicles  CFCs  became  important sources  of 
Subpart F income in  1982. 
Since Subpart F income produces a U.S. tax liability very similar to the 
liability  generated  by  an  actual  dividend  repatriation,  repatriated  actual 
dividends plus deemed distributions  indicate the fraction of foreign income 
subject to U.S. taxation each year.18 From the percentages in tables 5.7 and 
5.8,  it  is  clear  that  the  fraction  has  been  rising  over  time.  One  likely 
explanation for the recent increase in Subpart F income is the secular rise in 
interest  rates  and  the  corresponding  rise  in  the  returns  to CFCs’  passive 
investments.  But,  more  broadly,  Subpart F income  reflects  a  pattern  of 
increasing repatriations,  with Subpart F one vehicle for those repatriations. 
Unlike actual dividend distributions,  of course, Subpart F income does not 
make  funds  directly  available  to  the  parent.  However,  making  passive 
foreign investments and incurring  Subpart F liabilities-rather  than distrib- 
uting dividends-allows  a CFC’s U.S. parent to defer U.S. tax liability on 
the principal amount reinvested since Subpart F applies only to the return on 
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primary source of  that  income to be passive investments, reflects an even 
larger rise in foreign-earned income that U.S. multinationals have chosen not 
to reinvest actively abroad. 
U.S.  multinationals are also required to  pay  U.S.  taxes  on the current 
earnings (and deduct against U.S. income the current losses) of their foreign 
branches. Since branch income is not eligible for deferral of U.S. taxes, it is 
clearly not  in  the  interest of  tax-avoiding U.S.  multinationals to  organize 
their profitable operations in  low-tax foreign countries as branches rather 
than  subsidiaries.  The  literature  suggests  that  two  types  of  firms  might 
benefit from branch rather than subsidiary organization: petroleum firms that 
can recognize up-front tax losses from the special deductions for dry wells 
and  depletion  allowances  and  banks  that  can  avoid  onerous  foreign 
regulations by  not incorporating in foreign countries. 
Table 5.9 indicates the importance of  foreign branch operations of  U.S. 
multinationals for the three years for which separate data on branches  are 
available: 1982, 1980, and 1976. Total branch income (net of foreign taxes) 
in 1982 and 1980 is roughly equal to subsidiary dividend payments to U.S. 
parents  and  their  domestic  subsidiaries  (from  table  5.6),  while  in  1976 
branch  income  is  about  half  of  U.S.-taxable  dividends.  The  industry 
composition of  branch  income  is  quite  different  from  that  of  dividends, 
however. Finance, insurance,  and real estate (FIRE) firms earn more than 
half of total branch income, and petroleum companies earned more than half 
of  the non-FIRE branch income in  1982 and  1980.19 The FIRE branches 
were rather lightly taxed, while manufacturing branches endured foreign tax 
rates that average 73 percent in 1982, 68 percent in  1980, and 89 percent in 
1976. Since parent U.S. companies average their branch  income with  the 
dividends  they  receive  from  subsidiaries in  calculating  their  foreign  tax 
credits, these highly taxed manufacturing branches may act as “tax  cows” 
for American parents that  also have lightly taxed subsidiaries from which 
they  can  repatriate  dividends  to  soak  up  foreign  tax  credits  from  their 
branches.20 Whether the tax credits from foreign branches can help explain 
subsidiary dividend behavior requires an examination that  only  firm-level 
data can provide. 
5.3  Repatriation Behavior in 1984: Evidence from Micro Data 
5.3.1  Summary Evidence from the Data 
We  now analyze the dividend payout behavior of  U.S. multinationals in 
1984, using subsidiary-level tax information. These micro data argue for a 
very  different  interpretation  of  multinational  behavior  than  one  might 
suppose from the aggregate numbers. In particular, we find strong evidence 
in favor of the view that multinationals very effectively minimize their U.S. 
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Our  data  were  provided  by  the  U.S. Department  of  the  Treasury and 
consist of  information on the tax returns filed by  large U.S. multinationals 
with  controlled  foreign  corporations  in  1984.’l  Out  of  roughly  18,000 
controlled foreign corporations in  this  sample,  we  excluded firms  whose 
American parents had overall net operating losses and hence were untaxable 
on  their  foreign  income  that  year.  In  addition,  exclusions  for  inactive 
corporations,  corporations filing  part-year  returns,  missing  variables,  and 
obviously miscoded data reduce the sample to  12,041 foreign corporations 
and 453 American parent corporations. While the Internal Revenue Service 
estimated that a total of 45,000 CFCs would file information returns in 1984 
(see Skelly and Hobbs  1986), we  believe that our sample captures most of 
the economically significant CFCs. ’*  The sample does not include American 
multinationals whose only foreign affiliates are branches or those with  no 
controlled foreign corporations among their subsidiaries. Furthermore,  the 
data span only one tax year. While cross-sectional data are not ideal for our 
purposes, the year 1984 offers a distinct advantage over years such as 1982 
and 1980. Recessions in  1982 and 1980 created tax losses for CFCs and their 
American parents, reducing their chances of  filing important tax forms and 
making their taxable incomes particularly unreliable  proxies of  permanent 
incomes. By contrast, 1984 was a year of economic expansion in the United 
States and abroad. 
Most  significantly,  the  micro  data  enable  us  to  examine  whether  the 
summary information on  distributions obtained from aggregate data reflect 
similar patterns among relatively homogeneous CFCs. In fact, we find much 
the opposite to be true.  Most CFCs paid no  dividends, though a minority 
made large payouts. Below, we first report some summary tabulations of the 
data. We  then estimate a simple model of  the response of  CFC payouts to 
changes in the tax price of dividends, incorporating features of the domestic 
tax code that change the tax price regime. 
Based on the data for 12,041 CFCs in 1984, the average dividend payout 
rate  (out  of  after-tax  earnings)  to  U.S. parents  and  their  domestic  sub- 
sidiaries is  42.1  percent.  Including interest,  rent,  and  royalties raises the 
distribution rate  to  over 60 percent.  At  first  glance,  such  average payout 
figures seem consistent with  the Treasury data  for earlier years  discussed 
above.  However,  summary  figures  for  the  micro  data  obscure  important 
heterogeneity  in  patterns  of  repatriations.  To  illustrate  this  simply  and 
starkly, we decompose (in table 5.10) the sample into four cells, according 
to whether “dividends”  or “interest,  rent, and royalties”  (added t~gether)’~ 
distributed to the American parent are greater than zero. For each cell, we 
report  levels  of  assets,  pre-tax  earnings,  after-tax  earnings,  dividends, 
interest, rent, and royalties as well as the numbers of CFCs and U.S. parents 
involved. 
First, we observe that 69 percent of the CFCs-8,277  of them, accounting 
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earnings-paid  no dividends and no interest, rent, or royalties in 1984.24  An 
additional  1,815 CFCs-with  23 percent of  the  assets and  17 percent of 
after-tax earnings-paid  interest, rent,  and royalties but no dividends; their 
interest, rent, and royalty distributions equaled 65 percent of  their after-tax 
earnings. The 732 CFCs-with  15 percent of the total assets and 19 percent 
of total after-tax earnings-who  paid both dividends and interest, rents, and 
royalties distributed more  than their current after-tax earnings through the 
two channels. Finally, the  1,217 CFCs-with  17 percent of total assets and 
30 percent of  after-tax earnings-who  paid only dividends had  an  average 
payout rate of 86 percent. In short, dividend distributions are highly skewed; 
84 percent of the CFCs paid no dividends at all. 
It is difficult to reconcile these patterns within a strict agency cost model 
of  multinational dividend behavior. In that framework, the managers of  84 
percent of  the universe of  CFCs are unfettered by  the requirement to pay 
dividends each year. Of course, the use of a single annual cross section may 
obscure the payout behavior of firms that pay regular dividends on a less than 
annual basis, and some parent firms may use nondividend payout methods to 
control their  CFCs.  More  than  eight thousand  CFCs,  however,  pay  zero 
dividends, interest, rents,  and royalties to their American parents and their 
domestic subsidiaries. 
On the other hand, the data in table 5.10 appear to be quite consistent with 
a tax-minimization model of  multinational firm behavior. Most CFCs avoid 
current U.S.  tax  liability on  their foreign earnings.  And  the  selection of 
dividends  rather  than  other  forms  of  repatriation  is  consistent  with 
tax-minimizing principles: CFCs paying dividends but no interest, rent, and 
royalties faced on average lower tax rates (34 percent) than those choosing to 
pay interest, rent, and royalties but no dividends (51 percent). 
Some of  the complicated financial arrangements used  by  multinationals 
can  complicate interpretation of  the  statistics presented in  table  5.10. In 
particular, it is possible that  a relatively small number of  foreign holding 
companies (owned by American parents) themselves own the shares of many 
of  the  CFCs  in  our  sample;  the  dividends  that  they  receive  from  the 
“second-tier’’  CFCs  they  own  would  not  appear  as  repatriated by  those 
CFCs  to  American  parents  and  their  domestic  subsidiaries,  even  if  the 
holding companies then turned around and sent the profits back to the United 
States.  Those  dividends  would  appear  as  repatriated  by  the  holding 
companies, but  such schemes would be  consistent with  small numbers of 
CFCs  making  dividend  repatriations  at  the  same  time  that  aggregate 
dividends are large. 
In  fact,  CFCs  identified  as  nonbank  holding  companies  are  relatively 
unimportant in the sample, as are the FIRE industries generally; the sum of 
dividends paid  by  FIRE  CFCs  equals  $1.0  billion.  Table  5.11  provides 
further confirmation that  financial flows within  multinational firms do not 
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breakdown of  CFC financial behavior that includes dividends and interest, 
rents, and royalties received from other CFCs of the same American parent. 
As the table indicates, dividend flows from one CFC to another owned by 
the same parent are very  small, grossing only $190 million for the whole 
sample. Interest, rent, and royalty payments are significantly larger, grossing 
$3.4 billion, but the majority are received by CFCs that pay nothing to their 
American parents. With some adjustments, then, it remains true that most 
CFCs appear to generate no U.S. tax liability on their income each year. 
Section 5.2 illustrates the  increasing significance of  Subpart F income 
over time both absolutely and as a fraction of U.S.-taxable income of CFCs. 
Table  5.10 presents  information  on  the  Subpart  F  income  of  CFCs  in 
different repatriation regimes.  Total  Subpart F income in  1984 was  $3.3 
billion, representing a reduction from its level in 1982. In addition, Subpart 
F  income  is  heavily concentrated in  CFCs that  pay  no  dividends, a  fact 
consistent with  the  view  that  some CFCs place  their foreign  earnings in 
passive  foreign  investments  and  incur  Subpart  F  liabilities  as  a  tax- 
minimizing strategy (relative to paying dividends directly). Use of  such a 
strategy makes little sense, of  course, in the presence of significant costs of 
intrafirm control. 
The foreign tax credit status of a parent firm directly affects the tax cost of 
its CFCs’ repatriations. Table 5.12 offers fine detail on parent firms’ foreign 
tax  credit  positions  and  the  Subpart  F  payouts  of  the  non-FIRE  CFCs 
described in  table 5.10.  Several features of  these  decompositions are  of 
interest.  First,  sizable shares of  total  CFC  assets  (38 percent),  after-tax 
earnings (45 percent), and dividends (53 percent) are accounted for by CFCs 
of  firms with excess foreign tax credits. Second, firms with deficit foreign 
tax credits account for a disproportionate share (63 percent) of  repatriations 
in  the form of  interest, rent,  and royalties. This pattern is consistent with 
tax-minimizing behavior by  CFCs whose host governments permit them to 
adjust their interest, rent,  and royalty  payments to related  parties.  Third, 
deficit foreign tax credit firms also account for a disproportionate share (58 
percent)  of  Subpart  F  income,  again  in  accord  with  tax-minimizing 
principles. 
Given the small number of  CFCs that pay dividends at all and the excess 
foreign tax credit status of U.S. parents that receive about half the dividends, 
the question arises of  how much tax revenue the U.S. government collects 
on the profits earned by  foreign subsidiaries of  U.S. multinationals. Table 
5.13 breaks down by foreign tax rate those CFCs that either pay dividends or 
incur Subpart F liabilities and whose parents have deficit foreign tax credits. 
The  top  panel  presents  data  on  CFCs  whose  payout  is  less  than  their 
current-year earnings and profits; the CFCs in the bottom panel have payouts 
greater  than  current-year  earnings.  For  the  latter,  it  is  unfortunately 
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part of their payouts that exceed current-year income; still, current tax rates 
seem to be reasonable proxies for tax rates in earlier years. 
There is substantial variation in foreign tax rates for these CFCS,'~  with 
about  half  the  dividends coming from  CFCs  facing tax  rates of  over 40 
percent. In addition, there is some bunching at the lower ranges. For Subpart 
F income, the pattern is, as one might expect, different; the CFCs earning 
Subpart F income are lightly taxed by foreign governments. Since American 
parents receive foreign tax  credits for the foreign taxes paid by  the CFCs 
described in table 5.13 (and also receive credits for any foreign withholding 
taxes  paid  on  repatriation  of  those  dividends),  the  residual  after-credit 
income taxes paid to the U.S. government on CFC earnings in 1984 are very 
small. However, these small tax collections are associated with a system that 
has a large effect on CFC financial transactions generally, as we demonstrate 
below. 
Our finding that U.  S. taxation of dividend repatriations from multination- 
als raises very little revenue for the U.S.  government needs to be qualified 
by  the broader context of  the tax system. The (potential) U.S. taxation of 
dividends may prompt CFCs to remit more U.S.-taxable  interest, rent, and 
royalties than they otherwise would. In our sample of non-FIRE CFCs, only 
one-third of the interest, rent, and royalty payments ($1.5 billion out of $4.5 
billion)  were  received  by  parents  with  excess  foreign  tax  credits;  the 
remaining  two-thirds  were  presumably  taxable  at  full  rates.  In  addition, 
foreign  earnings  of  CFCs  may  generate  U.S.  tax  revenue  through  the 
taxation of  domestic U.S. shareholders of  parent companies since they are 
taxed  on  any  added  dividends  the  company  pays  because  of  its  foreign 
earnings and they may  pay  capital gains taxes on share price appreciation 
from foreign earnings as well. 
5.3.2 
Because  so  many  CFCs  in  our  sample  do  not  pay  any  dividends, 
estimating a  simple regression  model  of  dividend  distributions is  clearly 
inappropriate. In  particular, estimated tax price effects in such a regression 
are biased toward  zero.  Simple probit  models  (not reported) reinforce the 
patterns noted in our discussion of  table 5.12. The primary determinants of 
whether a CFC pays a dividend are the excess credit position of  its parent 
and the amount of  distributions in the form of  interest, rent,  and royalties. 
Industry effects do not appear to be very important in this respect. 
Estimating the Effects of  Taxation on Repatriations 
We  begin with a basic model of the form 
(3)  Di = (a,,  + (.u,TAXij)Ei  + P'X,, 
where j  and i index the parent and the CFC, respectively; D and E represent 
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D and E are deflated by CFC assets.26 TAX,  represents the tax price to U.S. 
parent j  of  distributions from  CFC  i.  X,  is  a  vector  of  parent j’s char- 
acteristics. If  the parent is in a deficit credit position, the tax price is given in 
equation (l).27  For parents in excess credit positions, we  take the U.S. tax 
price to be  zero,  28  though the parent may  owe withholding taxes on the 
dividends that cannot be credited against U.S. tax liabilities. 
With  panel  data,  one  would  incorporate the  excess credivdeficit credit 
position of  the parent in  a switching-regime model.  Indeed,  if  one could 
parameterize  the  transition  process  (from  excess  credit  to  deficit  credit 
position),  it  would  be  possible  in  principle  to  estimate  the  average 
probability of  being in one regime or the other. ‘We, of  course, have only a 
single cross section of data in which to observe the two regimes. The credit 
position is still endogenous. For example, higher payouts from CFCs with 
low tax prices make the parent firm more likely to have excess foreign tax 
credits. Indeed, even the location (and hence the foreign tax rate) of a CFC 
may be endogenous with respect to the tax rates of its parent’s other CFCs. 
Potential instrumental variables to identify the credit regime include branch 
income, branch taxes, and interest, rent, and royalties (to the extent that they 
are exogenous).  Unfortunately, the  tax  data do  not  come in  a  form  that 
permits  one  to  identify  this  non-CFC  income  and  foreign  taxes  (of  the 
parent) in order to employ an instrumental variables procedure. Accordingly, 
we take the excess crediudeficit credit position of the parent as exogenous to 
the CFC payout decision.*’ 
Given the significance (revealed by the summary of the data) of  the discrete 
choice of  whether to pay  a dividend, we  estimated a Tobit model of dividend 
distributions. There  are  two  regimes  (corresponding to  the  parent’s  credit 
position). To illustrate, we define a dummy variable X equal to unity if  the parent 
is in an excess credit position (and equal to zero otherwise) and estimate: 
(4)  Di  = (PO + PITA& + P&i)  + [P3  + P4(1 -  Xi)TAX,IEi 
if  Di > 0, 
= 0  otherwise. 
That is, we  allow the intercept to shift if  the parent is in an excess credit 
position.  We  also  included  on  the  right-hand  side  of  equation  (4) major 
industry dummy variables3’ and the parent firm’s ratio of its dividends paid 
to stockholders to its assets. 
The first column of  table 5.14 presents estimated coefficients from (4).3’ 
The principal findings can be  summarized as follows.  Conditional on  the 
CFC’s paying dividends and its parent’s having deficit credits, the tax price 
of CFC dividends has a negative effect on distributions. The response of the 
payout rate to a 1 percentage point decrease in  TAX  is an increase of 0.16 
percentage  points.  Evaluated  at  average  values  of  the  tax  price,  a  1 
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payout (relative to assets) by 0.28 percentage points, or about 4 percent of 
the mean CFC payout relative to assets. One cannot necessarily extrapolate 
such a change to evaluate the effects of  a large reduction in corporate taxes 
such as that enacted in the Tax Reform Act of  1986 since the lower tax rate 
affects the probability of being in an excess credit position. When the parent 
has excess foreign tax credits, payout is increased, ceteris paribus. 
The ratio of  parent dividends to parent assets has  a strong and positive 
effect on CFC distributions. This is consistent with a view that parents for 
whom  agency  problems  of  control  (between  domestic  shareholders  and 
domestic management) are  most  severe have  higher payouts  and,  ceteris 
paribus,  demand  more  cash  from  their  CFCs  to  make  these  payments. 
Alternatively, domestic parents receiving dividends from their  CFCs  find 
uses for those funds, one of which is to distribute dividends to shareholders. 
Finally,  coefficient estimates are not  dramatically changed whether or not 
industry dummies are included. Table 5.14 does not report coefficients for 
industry dummies when they are present; breakdowns within manufacturing 
generally had  estimated effects on  payouts  that  were  neither  statistically 
significant nor economically important. 
In the third column of table 5.14, we report results of estimating the same 
model, redefining the dependent variable to include Subpart F income. The 
estimated coefficients are similar to those in the first two columns, a result 
consistent with behavior by  multinationals that treats Subpart F income as 
similar to dividend income. 
5.4  Summary and Implications 
Despite the growing importance of activities of overseas affiliates of U.S. 
firms, relatively little is known about multinationals’ decisions to repatriate 
their foreign earnings. Analyses of aggregate data (and of data disaggregated 
to  the  level  of  major  industry  categories)  on  distributions  by  foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals point to significant levels of repatriations 
of  current earnings. Given the (domestic) tax costs of  this activity, it seems 
at first surprising that  subsidiaries should pay  so much  in dividends. The 
application of  models of domestic firms’ dividend decisions to this case is 
not  straightforward, however. First,  the aggregate data mask the fact that 
distributions are skewed; most  subsidiaries pay no dividends.  Second, the 
combination of  deferral and granting credits for foreign taxes paid implies 
that many repatriating firms have excess foreign tax credits, so that the tax 
price of repatriations is not what it appears. 
Understanding links between taxation and subsidiary repatriation decisions 
is  important  for assessing the  effect of  “dividend  taxes”  on the  cost of 
capital. Under the “trapped equity” view of the dividend decision (in which 
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rate matters for the cost of capital. Alternatively, when dividend patterns are 
of  concern to the parent (e.g., for agency cost reasons), both domestic and 
foreign tax rates matter for the cost of capital. 
Our results demonstrate that such simple pedagogical cases are likely to be 
difficult to apply. The relative unimportance of  industry effects-as  proxies 
for  investment  opportunities-within  broad  industry  groups  (such  as 
manufacturing) casts doubt on the pure  trapped equity view.  For  firms in 
deficit  credit  positions,  we  do  find  that  shifts  in  the  tax  prices  of  their 
repatriations matter, in support of the view that parents value some stream of 
repatriations, trading off perceived benefits with tax costs. However, many 
firms are in excess credit positions. The interaction of  (i) the credit system 
that  adjusts  for  the  burden  of  foreign  taxes  and  (ii)  deferral  by  taking 
subsidiary income only when repatriated implies that  at any point in time 
many subsidiaries (most, in our sample) are likely to be at corner solutions, 
paying no dividends. 
One  concern  stemming  from  our  findings  is  that-if  1984  is  a 
representative  year-many  U.S.  parents  are  able  to  take  advantage  of 
intrafirm  financial transactions  and  their  abilities to  time  repatriations  in 
order to  reduce  their U.S. tax  liabilities. That is,  the combination of  the 
credit system and deferral can diminish substantially the revenue raised by 
the  United  States  from  the  taxation  of  overseas  operations  of  U.S. 
 multinational^.^^  Given  the  volume  of  activity  conducted  by  foreign 
affiliates of  U.S.  firms, these revenue consequences of  the present system 
may be important. Of  course, the recent reduction in the U.S.  statutory tax 
rate from 46 to 34 percent increases the likelihood that many multinational 
firms will have excess foreign tax credits.33 The effect of  the rate reduction 
may be offset somewhat by  the introduction of  new  functional baskets of 
foreign income and new methods of  calculating indirect foreign tax credits 
introduced  by  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986,  but  it  remains  to  be 
demonstrated that the current system of  taxing foreign subsidiaries of  U.S. 
multinationals can generate significant amounts of  tax revenue. 
We  believe  that  our  analysis  suggests  the  importance  of  modeling 
explicitly the margins on  which payments from subsidiaries to parents are 
accomplished. The present U.S.  system  of  taxing multinationals’ income 
may  be  raising  little  U.S.  tax  revenue  while  stimulating  a  host  of 
tax-motivated  financial  transactions.  Whether  current  U.S.  policy  is  a 
sensible approach depends very much on what  we  intend our international 
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Table 5.1  Dividends Wid by CFCs to U.S. Parents as a Share of CFC Post-tax 
Earnings (%) 




















Total of  manufacturing 
Total manufacturing, 
All U.S. Corporations' 
six 
except six 
21  27  21  31  33  43  33  38  47 
28  8  12  15  31  23  21  17  24 
15  8  9  11  35  33  19  16  20 
24  30  22  32  35  45  34  38  50 
21  3238  22  18  30  48  34  29  62 
29  26  32  31  33  47  42  34  40 
20  27  23  26  44  84  36  49  58 
10  43  12  36  39  32  32  31  34 
22  13  18  11  16  24  14  17  38 
231  91  23  142  43  41  68  60  71 
7  16  13  21  11  24  31  28  35 
19  15  39  33  15  26  29  37  40 
5  11  4  19  27  39  34  41  46 
2  3  3  42  17  40  25  33  50 
14  25  5  20  50  6  0  0 
I1  22  10  66  27  36  24  69  23 
22  31  21  32  37  47  38  40  53 
33  26  33  32  27  38  23  32  40 
69  33  29  29  39  43  37  38  43 
Sources: 1982 table  I, pp. 75-80  in [Ill; 1980 table 1, pp. 190-95  in [8]; 1976 table 11, pp. 262-85 
in [7]; 1974 table 2, pp.  14-33  in [6]; 1972 table 16, pp. 93-97  in 131; 1968 table 2, p. 17 in [3]; 1966 
table 29, pp.  270-73  in [2];  1965 table 25, pp. 254-57  in 121;  1962 table  13, p. 86 in [l]. 
a1968 dividends paid to related persons, 1966 payments by  directly owned foreign corporation,  1965 
payments  by  directly  owned foreign  corporation, and  1962 dividends paid  to domestic  corporation. 
1972-82  U.S.  corporations with assets of  at least $250 million. 
bFinance, insurance, and real estate. 
'Figures  are adapted from Poterba (1987). Table 5.2 
US.  Industry  1982  1980  1976  1974  1972  1968"  1  966a  1965"  1962" 
All  industries  4,829  8,358  3,112  4,095  3,210  1,978  1,512  1,445  1,127 
Mining  188  75  36  44  35  13  22  11  5 
Construction  40  27  38  22  5  22  15  12  8 
Manufacturing  4,224  7,635  2,624  3,747  2,985  1,775  1,345  1,237  968 
Food  33 1  259  198  114  158  121  87  72  79 
Chemicals  922  1,004  566  656  399  325  227  173  118 
Petroleum  908  2,417  486  1,028  805  493  324  314  293 
Nonelectrical machinery  383  1,825  317  655  618  175  179  135  52 
Electronic equipment  295  254  182  97  118  107  42  35  42 
Motor vehicles  324  196  359  569  345  193  25 1  269  197 
Transportation and public utilities  85  113  36  48  27  21  13  15  13 
Trade  187  294  350  178  59  87  71  91  76 
FIRE  83  144  20  38  61  45  32  37  36 
Insurance carriers  41  28  5  3  11  1  1  0  0 
Services  21  69  8  15  20  20  19  43  24 
Total of manufacturing six  3,163  5,956  2,108  3,119  2,443  1,414  1,110  998  780 
Total manufacturing, except six  1,061  1,679  516  628  542  361  235  239  189 
Dividends Paid by CFCs to U.S. Parents 
Banking  18  13  8  24  10  6  2  2  2 
Sources: 1982 table  1, pp.  75-80  in [ll]; 1980 table 1, pp.  190-95  in [8]; 1976 table  11, pp.  262-85  in [7]; 1974 table 2, pp.  14-33  in [6];  1972 table  16, pp. 
93-97  in [3];  1968 table 2, p.  17 in [3]; 1966 table 29, p. 270-73  in [2]; 1965 table 25, p. 254-57  in [2];  1962 table 13, p.  86 in [l]. 
Nore: All figures are in millions of current dollars. 
"1968 dividends paid to related persons,  1966 payments by directly owned foreign  corporation,  1965 payments by  directly owned foreign  corporation,  and  1962 
dividends paid to domestic corporation.  1972-82  U.S.  corporations with assets of at least $250 million. 182  James R. Hines, Jr./R. Glenn Hubbard 
Table 5.3 
Country of  Incorporation of CFC  1982  1976  1974  1972  196ga  1962" 
All countries  .21  .21  .22  .33  .30  .39 
Canada  .30  .24  .I8  .37  .25  .39 
Mexico  -.24  .97  .I4  .39  .28  .50 
Brazil  .I7  .15  .19  .20  .46  .06 
Bahamas  .10  2.36  .39  .21  .I3  .I0 
France  .89  .23  .I3  .23  .42  .25 
Netherlands  .I7  .I3  .05  -.20  .26  .20 
United Kingdom  .I2  .20  -.64  .21  .47  .56 
West Germany  .26  .I8  .45  .46  .38  .71 
Japan  .21  .I1  .20  .I7  .I2  .07 
All others  .20  .20  .I9  .30  .27  .30 
CFC Dividend Payout Ratios to U.S. Parents, by  Country 
Sources: 1982 table  1, pp. 63-65  in  1121;  1976 table  16, pp. 310-21  in  [7]; 1974 table 7, pp. 
61-84  in [6]; 1972 table 23, pp. 133-56  in [3]; 1968 table 8, pp. 43-64  in [3]; 1962 table 22, 
pp.  130-35  in  [I]. 
"Payout ratios  are calculated  on after-tax earnings  of  the CFC.  1968 payments to  all related 
persons.  1962 payments to domestic corporations. 
Table 5.4  CFC Payouts to U.S. Parents, by  Country 






















































1968"  1962" 
1,423  1,133 
325  316 
32  22 
58  3 
11  5 
54  24 
18  11 
284  271 
172  151 
9  1 
460  329 
Sources: 1982 table  1, pp. 63-65  in  [12]; 1976 table  16, pp. 310-21  in  [7]; 1974 table 7, pp. 
61-84  in [6]; 1972 table 23, pp.  133-56  in [3]; 1968 table 8, pp. 43-64  in [3]; 1962 table 22, 
pp.  130-35  in  [I]. 
aAll figures are in millions of current dollars. Payments to U.S.  corporations filing returns.  1962 
payments to domestic corporations.  1968 payments to all related persons. Table 5.5  Distribution Patterns: CFCs of U.S. Parents (Selected Years): Fraction of  Pretax Earnings Plus Interest, Rent, and Royalties 
Distributed to U.S. Parents 
U.S.  Industry 
Dividends  Interest,  Rents, Royalties  Both 















Total of six manufacturing 
Total manufacturing, except six 
.12  .18  .19  .22 
.08  .12  .22  .18 
.06  .09  .21  .18 
.12  .19  .20  .23 
.13  .10  .18  .26 
.18  .19  .19  .26 
.16  .18  .31  .43 
.06  .17  .20  .14 
.ll  .06  .10  .23 
.14  .64  .24  .21 
.07  .ll  .07  .14 
.21  .01  .10  .16 
.02  1.12  .13  .16 
.04  .41  .13  .10 
.12  .19  .21  .24 

















































.14  .21  .26  .27  .36 
.06  .ll  .16  .34  .24 
.17  .16  .21  .32  .35 
.13  .21  .26  .28  .36 
.ll  .19  .17  .23  .36 
.12  .27  .26  .28  .38 
.16  .18  .20  .34  .60 
.18  .23  .35  .35  .32 
.09  .15  .ll  .18  .22 
.06  .16  .68  .26  .28 
.20  .19  .22  .15  .34 
.05  .21  .02  .ll  .21 
.28  .13  1.50  .32  .44 
.55  .43  .03  .33  .65 
.13  .21  .26  .29  .37 
.13  .21  .25  .23  .33 
Sources: 1976 table 11, pp. 270-85  in [7]; 1974 table 2, pp.  14-33  in [6]; 1972 table  16, pp. 93-97  in [3];  1968 table 2, pp.  13-17  in [3]. 
Note: Figures are for U.S. corporations and their CFCs reported on Form 2952.  Data for 1972-76  are for U.S.  corporations with assets of at least $250 million. 184  James R. Hies, Jr./R. Glenn Hubbard 
Table 5.6  Direct and Indirect Dividend Payments by  CFCs to U.S. Parents 
1982  1980  1976  1974  1972  1968 
Dividends paid ($)  13,762  13,211  6,279  6,570  4,682  1,978 
Fraction representing: (9%): 
Payments to U.S. parent  35.1  63.3  49.6  62.3  68.6  72.2 
Payments to U.S. 
17.4  26’8}  37.7  31.4  27.8 
subsidiaries of U.S. parent  40.3 
Payments to foreign 
InteresUdividends  N.A.  .36  .08  .24  .21  .24 
subsidiaries of  U.S. parent  24.6  19.3  23.6 
Rent and royalties/dividends  N.A.  .34  .64  .30  .30  .39 
Sources: 1982 table 1, pp. 75-80  in  [12]; 1980 table  I, pp.  190-95  in  [S]; 1976 table  11, pp. 
262-85  in [7]; 1974 table 2, pp.  14-33  in [6]; 1972 table  16, pp. 93-97  in [3]; 1968 table 2, 
p. 17 in [3] 
Note:  Dollar amounts are in millions of  current dollars. Table 5.7  Dividend Payouts by  CFCs to U.S. Parents and Their Domestic Subsidiaries (70) 
Payout Ratios 










(continued) Table 5.7 (continued) 
Payout Ratios 
U.S. Industry  1982  1980  1976  1974"  1972"  1968=  1966"  1965"  1962" 
Motor vehicles  376 
(101) 
Transportation and public utilities  39 
(31) 
Trade  69 
(49) 
FIRE  37 
(26) 
Services  49 
Total of manufacturing six  63 
(37) 
Total manufacturing, except six  65 
(27) 
(41) 
Sources: 1982 table 1, pp. 75-80  in [ll]; 1980 table  1, pp. 190-95  in  [8]; 1976 table  11, pp. 262-85  in [7]; 1974 table 2, pp.  14-33  in [6]; 1972 table 16, pp. 93-97  in 
[3]; 1968 table 2, p. 17 in [3]; 1966 table 29, pp. 270-73  in [2]; 1965 table 25, pp.  254-57  in [2]; 1962 table 13, p. 86 in  [l]. 
Note: Data are for U.S. corporations and their CFCs reported on Form 2952. Payout ratios based on after-tax earnings appear first; payout ratios based on pretax earnings are 
in parentheses.  1972-82:  U.S. corporations with assets of at least $250 million. 
'1968  dividends paid to related persons,  1966 and 1965 payments by  directly owned foreign corporation,  1962 dividends paid to domestic corporations, and  1972 and 1974 
dividends include payments to foreign subsidiaries of  U .S. corporations. 187  Dividend Repatriations by U.S.  Multinationals 
Table 5.8  Subpart F Income of U.S. CFCs Relative to CFC Dividend Payouts 
U.S. Industry 
~ 






















Sources: 1982 table 1,  pp. 75-80  in [Ill; 1980 table 1,  pp.  190(N95 in [8]; 1976 table 11, pp. 262-85 
in [7]; 1974 table 2, pp.  14-33  in [6]; 1972 table 16, pp. 93-97  in [3]; 1968 table 2, p. 17 in [3]; 1966 
table 29, pp. 270-73  in [2]; 1965 table 25, pp.  254-57  in [2]; 1962 table  13, p. 86 in [I]. 
Note:  Dollar amounts in millions are includable (Subpart F) income of  CFCs.  Figures in parentheses 
are ratios  of  Subpart F income to dividends paid by  CFCs to  U.S. corporations  and their domestic 
subsidiaries. 
"1972 and  1968 dividend payments include dividends paid to foreign subsidiaries of  the U.S. parent. Table 5.9  Foreign Branches of U.S. Corporations: Income and Foreign Taxes 
1982  1980  1976 
After-tax  After-tax  After-tax 
Branch Income  Branch Income  Branch Income 
After-tax  Foreign  as a Share of  After-tax  Foreign  as a Share of  After-tax  Foreign  as a Share of 
Branch  Branch  CFC Dividends  Branch  Branch  CFC Dividends  Branch  Branch  CFC Dividends 
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Sources: 1982 table  1, pp.  19-26  in [9];  1980 table  1, pp.  51-59  in [8];  1976 table 2,  pp. 92-99  in [7] 
"Dividends paid include payments to U.S. parent and its domestic subsidiary. 
Note: Dollar figures are in millions. Data obtained from Form 11  18, U.S. corporation returns. Table 5.10  Distribution Breakdowns: Micro Data on U.S. CFCs in 1984 
Number of 
Pretax  After- tax  Average Tax  Interest, Rent,  Subpart 
Assets ($)  Earnings ($)  Earnings ($)  Rate (%)  Dividends ($)  Royalties ($)  F ($)  CFCs  Parents 
Dividends and interest, 
rent, royalties > 0 
Dividends > 0; interest, 
rent, royalties = 0 
Dividends = 0; interest, 
rent, royalties > 0 
Dividends and interest, 
rent, royalties = 0 
42.5  3.8 
34.2  6.3 
50.6  0 
(0) 




732  183 
1,217  252 
1,815  288 
8,277  433 
(.06) 
(. 10) 
(.  15) 
(.  69) 
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on U.S. Treasury data described in the text. 
Note: Dollar amounts are in billions of  dollars. Figures in parentheses are shares of column totals. 190  James R. Hines, JrJR. Glenn Hubbard 
Table 5.11  Financial Flows between Parties Related to U.S. CFCs, 1984 ($) 
Dividends  Interest, Rent, Royalties 
Received  Paid to U.S.  Received  Paid to  U.S. 
Dividends and interest, 
rent, royalties > 0 
Dividends > 0; interest, 
rent, royalties  = 0 
Dividends = 0; interest, 
rent, royalties > 0 
Dividends and interest, 
rent, royalties  = 0 
Source: Author’s tabulations based on U.S.  Treasury data described in the text. 
Note: Dollar amounts are in billions  of  dollars.  Figures  in parentheses  are shares of  column 
totals. Table 5.12  Distribution Breakdowns: Detail on Credit Position and Subpart F Liabilities, 1984 
Billions of  Dollars  Number of: 
Interest, 
Pretax  After-tax  Rent, 
Assets  Earnings  Earnings  Dividends  Royalties  Subpart F  CFCs  Parents 
Dividends and interest, rents, royalties > 0: 
Excess credit; Subpart F = 0 
Excess credit; Subpart F > 0 
Deficit credit; Subpart F = 0 

















Excess credit; Subpart F = 0 
Excess credit; Subpart F > 0 
Deficit credit; Subpart F = 0 






(continued) Table 5.12  (continued) 
~~ 
Billions of Dollars  Number of 
Interest, 
Pretax  After-tax  Rent, 
CFCs  Parents  Assets  Earnings  Earnings  Dividends  Royalties  Subpart F 


















Excess credit; Subpart F = 0 
Excess credit; Subpart F > 0 
Deficit credit; Subpart F = 0 
Deficit credit; Subpart F > 0 
Excess credit; Subpart F = 0 
Excess credit; Subpart F > 0 
Deficit credit; Subpart F = 0, 












Source: Authors’ tabulations based on U.S. Treasury data described in the text. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of column totals. Table 5.13  Foreign Tax Rates of  CFCs hying Dividends to Parents with Deficit Foreign Tax Credits, 1984 
Earnings  Interest, 
Earnings  and Profits  Rents,  Number of 
All Industries  Assets  and Profits  After Tax  Dividends  Royalties  Subpart F  CFCS 
Payout less than current earnings and profits after tax: 
Foreign tax rate: 
Total  57,264  9,424  6,299  2,247  1,474  792  794 
520%  24,074  2,594  2,465  389  205  682  284 
20-30%  4,093  596  439  101  27  40  82 
30-40%  9,951  1,915  1,199  395  362  52  115 
40-40%  8,818  2,436  1,362  806  245  7187 
50-60%  7,824  1,538  727  519  517  1  89 
>60%  2,502  346  105  43  62  11  37 
Total  31,828  2,994  1,942  2,187  264  1,145  645 
Payout more than current earnings and profits after tax: 
Foreign tax rate: 
520%  18,861  1,155  1,070  1,020  57  897  342 
20-30%  3,101  198  144  64  23  121  42 
30-40%  1,238  152  99  167  18  7  55 
40-50%  2,145  282  151  215  72  37  75 
>60%  3,735  440  111  257  38  74  80 
50-60%  2,748  766  365  462  54  8  51 
~  ~  ~~~  ~~ 
Note:  Figures are in millions of  dollars. Details may not add to totals due to rounding. 194  James R.  Hines, Jr./R.  Glenn Hubbard 
Table 5.14  Tobit Model of  CFC Dividend Distributions 
~ 
Dependent Variable 






Parent dividendsiparent assets 
Industry dummies 
Log likelihood 
Percentage with payout 
Number of  observations 
-  14.6359 
(.4511) 











-  8,452.2 
16.7 
10,606 
-  15.7046 
(  .3070) 














-  10.2714 
(.3268) 
-  .0101 
(.0076) 
,6281 








-  9,437.5 
20.2 
10,606 
-  10.8799 
(.2204) 
-  .0097 













Note; Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Notes 
1. Controlled  foreign  corporations  also  made  sizable  repatriations  out  of  their 
pre-foreign-tax  income  in  the  form  of  interest,  rent,  and  royalties  paid  to  their 
American parents. These data are reported in Goodspeed and Frisch (1989). 
2.  This list includes France, Belgium, the Netherlands,  and Norway; others such 
as  Switzerland  and  West  Germany  have  complicated  systems  that  are  hybrids  of 
territorial and residence systems. 
3.  For  somewhat  more  detail  on  the  foreign  tax  credit  mechanism  and  recent 
changes therein,  see Auk and Bradford  (in this volume); for more comprehensive 
treatment of earlier law, see McDaniel and Ault (1981). In order to be eligible for the 
credit, firms must own at least 10 percent of a foreign affiliate, and only those taxes 
that qualify as income taxes are creditable. Further, there are some complications in 
the calculation of  deemed-paid credits that are important to the results presented in 
sec. 5.3 
4.  This feature may be more important in an international setting since exchange 
rate variability can create substantial changes  in dollar-denominated capital values. 
For a critical analysis of recent legislative changes in the U.S. taxation of income and 
capital values affected by foreign exchange movements,  see Wahl (1987). 
5. The  nomenclature  is  somewhat  detailed.  All  foreign  operations  take  place 
through  affiliates; those  that  are separately  incorporated  are  subsidiaries.  Majority 
ownership is sometimes very important from a legal, economic, and data-reporting 
standpoint; much of  the U.S. Department of  Commerce data on foreign operations of 
U.S. multinationals is reported  for majority-owned  foreign  affiliates,  without  dis- 195  Dividend Repatriations by U. S. Multinationals 
tinguishing  branches  from  subsidiaries.  Controlled  foreign  corporations  are  the 
subset of subsidiaries that meet the ownership requirements described in the text; they 
need not be (but usually are) majority owned by a single parent. 
6. It  seems reasonable  here to assume that  there  are  no  fundamental  (i.e.,  not 
related to taxes) differences between debt and equity contracts, so long as the parent 
is the sole owner of either claim. Caves (1982) discusses evidence on this point. 
7. For  a  concise  survey  of  OECD  withholding  rates  on  various  types  of 
remittances, see Alworth (1988, chap. 4). All are well below statutory tax rates. See 
also various issues of Price Waterhouse’s Corporate Taxes. 
8.  For further elaboration of this model, see also Poterba and Summers (1985) and 
Poterba (1987). 
9. Tax-minimizing multinationals have incentives to raise the (recorded) prices of 
goods  sold  by  affiliates  in  low-tax  jurisdictions  to  other  affiliates  in  higher-tax 
jurisdictions.  Properly  used,  transfer  pricing  can  repatriate  profits  from  high-tax 
foreign countries while generating tax deductions in those countries. Naturally, U.  S. 
and  foreign  tax  authorities  discourage tax-minimizing  transfer  price  manipulations 
and have adopted regulations to deter firms from engaging in them. For the purposes 
of this paper, we will assume that those rules are binding and that transfer pricing 
cannot be used for tax avoidance in repatriations. For evidence that transfer prices are 
sensitive to tax considerations, see Wheeler (1988) and Grubert and Mutti (1989); for 
contrary evidence, see Bernard and Weiner (in this volume).  Of course, in a wide 
class  of  circumstances,  it  is  difficult  even  to  know  what  constitute  appropriate 
transfer  prices  for  goods  traded  within  multinational  corporations;  Hines  ( 1988a) 
suggests an approach to this problem. 
10.  Foreign  subsidiaries  of  multinational  firms are  unable  to  use  other devices 
commonly employed by domestic firms to distribute earnings to shareholders without 
creating  a  dividend  tax  liability.  For  example,  share  repurchases  and  liquidating 
distributions  by  foreign  subsidiaries  are  treated  for  tax  purposes  as  if  they  were 
dividends. 
11.  Detailed reviews of tax-minimizing patterns of intrafirrn financial transactions 
in multinationals can be found in Alworth (1988) and Scholes and Wolfson (1988). 
Scholes and Wolfson consider as well the effects of U.S.  taxation on the decision of 
foreign multinationals to acquire U.S.  firms. 
12.  Even  in  the  case of  a  domestic  firm,  signaling  models  must  confront  the 
empirical regularity (in U.S.  data) that  large, mature firms have high payout rates 
while small, growing firms (with presumably the greatest need to signal) have very 
low or zero payout rates (see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988). 
13.  Agency cost motivations for dividend distributions are considered by Jensen 
(1986) and Hubbard and Reiss (1988). 
14.  Some caution  must  be  exercised  in  interpreting  such  results.  Kopits  uses 
pooled cross-sectionavtime-series  data on subsidiaries in different countries in 1961 
and  1962.  Since  fixed  country  effects  were  not  included,  we  cannot  separate 
co-movements  among  variables  reflecting  persistent  differences  across  countries 
(e.g.,  in the mix of industries of the constituent subsidiaries) from true within-group 
vanation. Horst (1972) notes that certain (two-digit) industry groups are more likely 
to invest abroad, so that analyses of payout ratios by country without information on 
industry composition or comparison of payout ratios of subsidiaries (as a whole) with 
U.S.  firms (as a whole) may not be informative. 
15. The period before  1962 remains something of a black box to the tax analyst. 
The tax system was quite different before 1962, but the reason that we do not include 
those years  in our analysis is that tax  data on multinational  financial behavior are 
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16.  The  payout  ratios  reported  in  Poterba  (1987)  do not  incorporate  foreign 
earnings  and  retentions  of  American  multinationals,  making  the  comparison 
somewhat strained. However, adjusted payout ratios reported in Hines (1988b) do not 
differ greatly from those in Poterba (1987). 
17.  Data on Subpart F income are available for years prior to 1968 but  are not 
reported in table 5.8. The years before 1968 are very similar to 1968 and 1972 in that 
Subpart F income is trivial relative to actual dividend distributions. 
18.  One hesitates to construct a series of such numbers in part because some of the 
repatriations  designated  as  dividends  in  the  data  may  represent  income  that  was 
previously  (or  possibly  even  currently)  deemed  distributed  as  Subpart F. Hence, 
there is the possibility of double counting that income. Figures for dividend payments 
to American parents and their domestic subsidiaries are taken from Form 5471 and its 
predecessor Form 2952; these forms instruct the taxpayer not to include as dividends 
the deemed distributions under Subpart F. But it is somewhat ambiguous whether to 
include as a current-year dividend the current distributions of Subpart F income of 
prior years. Because Subpart F income is stacked first in the payout inventory rules, 
this may not be a major problem.  And, since firms have little incentive to overstate 
their  dividends  on Form  5741,  we  follow  the Treasury  in  treating  dividends  and 
Subpart F income separately. 
19. The  growth  of  petroleum  firms  after  1974  may  be  responsible  for  the 
anomalously  low  petroleum  industry  eamings  in  1976.  Since  oil  companies  can 
expense for tax  purposes  part  of their exploration  and development  costs,  taxable 
earnings are likely to  be low in a period of rapid growth. This observation  should 
reinforce one’s caution in drawing conclusions from simple cross sections of taxable 
income and tax rates. 
20.  Certain types of income are kept in separate  “baskets”  to prevent just such 
pooling.  The  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986 strengthened  the  functional  separation  of 
various income types (see also Ault and Bradford,  in this volume).  In addition, the 
creditability of foreign taxes on petroleum  income has since  1975 been  subject  to 
various limits. 
21.  This sample is a  subset of  the sample collected by  the Statistics of Income 
Division of the Internal Revenue Service on the same basis as that used to construct 
the aggregate statistics described in sec. 5.2. Strictly speaking, the universe for this 
sample  is  large  U.S.  multinationals  reporting  on  their  tax  forms  that  they  have 
controlled  foreign  corporations  in  1984.  The  data  of  course  cannot  include 
corporations  that  fail to file their  tax  forms,  and there  is  some  evidence  that  tax 
noncompliance is a particularly  serious problem for corporations earning income in 
offshore tax havens (see Rice 1989). But the questionable income of this group seems 
unlikely to be quantitatively significant compared to the corporations we include. 
22.  Goodspeed and Frisch (1989) analyze data from a larger sample of  CFCs in 
1984, one that was not restricted in the same way as ours. The CFCs in their sample 
had after-foreign-tax earnings of $30 billion,  while ours had $24 billion; their CFCs 
paid $11.8 billion in dividends, ours $10.1 billion. 
23.  We  add  interest,  rent,  and  royalty  payments  together  in  the  subsequent 
analysis because they represent repatriation methods that (usually) share the feature 
of tax deductibility in CFCs’ host countries. We  do not claim that they are identical; 
in particular, the three types of payments are often subject to different withholding 
tax rates by foreign governments, and their levels may be restricted in different ways. 
Our  focus  in  any  case  is  on dividend  payments;  we  presume  firms  to  have  less 
year-to-year discretion over interest, rent,  and royalty payments  than they do over 
dividend distributions. 
24.  A potential complication  arises in interpreting these data since, prior to the 
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treat dividends paid in the first sixty days of their annual accounting period as paid 
during the previous year. This rule, enacted to permit firms with complicated foreign 
tax  situations  the  opportunity  to  calculate  their  foreign  tax  obligations  before 
selecting their repatriation strategies for the year, makes it almost impossible for us to 
know the tax consequences of a year’s dividend payouts since firms are not required 
to indicate on their tax forms to which year dividends paid in the first sixty days are 
attributed. This problem has not been previously addressed, though it applies to all 
the published U.S.  aggregate data and to all the micro data of which we are aware; 
the  aggregate  numbers  reported  in  Statistics  of  Income  publications  represent 
dividends paid at any time during the tax year. As it happens, this problem is not 
quantitatively significant (at least in  1984) since of  $9.15 billion paid in dividends 
(outside FIRE industries) only $1.15 billion were reported to have been paid during 
the first sixty days. 
25. It is interesting to note in table 5.13 that the pretax rate of return (on assets) 
generally rises with the tax rate, as one would expect.  It declines sharply, however, 
for firms with the highest foreign tax rates, perhaps implying judicious use of transfer 
pricing to lower reported  earnings  in  such jurisdictions.  We  are  grateful  to Mark 
Wolfson for this observation. 
26.  There are other reasonable candidates for variables with which to deflate D 
and E in (3) and subsequently; our discussant Mark Wolfson suggested stockholder’s 
equity  rather  than  total  assets.  Our  choices  are, however,  tightly  constrained  by 
limited data: total CFC assets is the only reliable stock variable we could extract from 
the tax forms. 
27.  In our empirical work, we use .46 for T  and the average foreign tax rate of the 
CFC for T*. Since none of  the  American parents  in our sample had domestic tax 
losses that year and all are large corporations,  .46 is a very close approximation of 
their marginal U.S. corporate tax rates.  The average foreign tax rate is the best that 
one can do for T*;  without panel data, it is impossible to know exactly the indirectly 
creditable foreign tax rate on dividends that exceed current-year earnings and profits. 
Two additional features of foreign tax systems are not included in the tax prices we 
use.  One is  that  we  ignore  foreign  withholding  taxes  on  dividends.  These  taxes 
represent net costs when American parents have excess foreign tax credits. The other 
is that some countries like West Germany employ split-rate corporate tax systems that 
tax distributed profits differently (less heavily, in the German case) than reinvested 
profits. Variations in withholding taxes and corporate tax systems are unlikely to be 
important enough to change the results reported  in table 3.14, but we are currently 
investigating those effects. 
28.  This is not fully  satisfactory, of course,  since excess credits  can be carried 
forward. That is, there is an opportunity cost of suing excess credits in a given period 
and  a potential  benefit from  generating  additional  excess credits.  These costs and 
benefits depend on the discount rate and the probability of transiting to a deficit credit 
state  (itself  endogenous).  Absent  longitudinal  data on  the  parent’s  tax  status and 
foreign income, there is little scope for incorporating this consideration. 
29.  To the extent that our results are biased, one would expect the estimated tax 
price effect to be understated. 
30.  The industries are mining, construction, transportation, trade, services, and the 
following manufacturing industries: food, chemicals, nonelectrical machinery, electronic 
equipment, and motor vehicles; the excluded category is other manufacturing industries. 
31.  This equation  is estimated  only  for non-FIRE  CFCs, in order to avoid the 
potential problem that the dividend payments of a manufacturing CFC to a holding 
company that owns it would be double counted as income. 
32.  Modifying  these  provisions  for  the  taxation  of  multinationals  (say,  by 
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of  the corporate income tax because some attempt would have to be  made to measure 
“profits”  of the  CFC.  One alternative would be  to adopt  a variant of  a corporate 
“cash  flow”  tax,  which  would  tax  the  difference  between  net  revenues  and 
investment expenditures. In such a system, there is no argument for crediting foreign 
taxes paid; because  investment  is expensed,  the  U.S. Treasury  is a partner  in  the 
firm’s equity. Absent the credit, the U.S. parent would get its share (one minus the 
corporate-cash-flow tax  rate)  of  the  net-of-foreign-tax  returns  from investing.  The 
removal  of  deferral  and  the  credit  system  removes  much  of  the  incentive  to  use 
financial transactions to time tax payments. 
33.  This is significant, of  course, only to the extent that other countries do not 
follow suit in reducing their statutory tax rates. 
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Comment  Mark A. Wolfson 
I enjoyed this paper very much, particularly  the analysis of the micro data 
for  1984. The exercise serves to remind us just how  much richness can be 
lost when our inferences about economic behavior are necessarily  restricted 
to economic aggregates. 
Hines  and  Hubbard  (hereafter  HH)  partition  the  data  in  particularly 
informative  ways.  Like  all  good  descriptive  work,  the  analysis  raises  as 
many questions as it answers. And one of the nice things about working with 
micro  data  is  that  the  questions  raised  might  actually  be  answerable. 
Whereas  parsimony  in  modeling  is especially  virtuous  when  the  available 
data afford few degrees of freedom  (the typical situation when  macro data 
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are used), there are returns to more sophisticated modeling when micro data 
are available, particularly when they offer thousands of degrees of freedom. 
Before providing some examples of  what I have in  mind here, let me first 
make a few more general remarks about the paper. 
The claim that there exists a dividend puzzle would seem to be a bit of a 
red herring in a multinational context in the presence of  a foreign tax credit 
system. So is the fact that the U.S. Treasury appears to collect no corporate- 
level tax on the profits earned abroad by U.S. multinationals. 
Unlike in the domestic context, where a current dividend gives rise to the 
collection of current tax revenues by the U.S. Treasury, a dividend paid to a 
U.S. multinational by  a profitable subsidiary operating in  a country with a 
tax rate similar to that in  the United States will, to a first approximation, 
yield no  current revenues to the U.S. Treasury by  design. So we need not 
resort to a “trapped equity” calculus to remind us that the cost of a current 
dividend to the declaring firm is less than the immediate tax cost because, to 
a first approximation, there is not  an immediate tax cost, let alone a future 
one.  Indeed,  the  most  interesting  aspect  of  the  paper  is  that  U.S. 
multinational firms appear to be so careful in tax planning that they leave 
clearly identifiable audit trails that document their attempts to contain even 
the second-order effects of multinational tax rules on their tax liabilities. 
Having  said  this,  it  is  nevertheless misleading  to  state that  the  U.S. 
Treasury  collects  no  revenues  on  the  foreign  profits  earned  by  U.S. 
multinationals. A component of taxes that HH (and others in this literature) 
have forgotten is the shareholder-level tax. As U.S.  multinationals generate 
profits abroad, share prices increase, and the resulting increase in domestic 
dividends and capital gains give rise to U.S. tax revenues. This source of tax 
revenue may well increase following passage of the Tax Reform Act of  1986 
because the reduction in the capital gains tax break increases shareholder- 
level taxes. 
Prior to  presenting their data,  HH  attempt to lay out a framework for 
understanding (1) the incentives to repatriate foreign earnings in alternative 
forms (by means of dividends, interest, rent, royalties, transfer pricing, and 
Subpart F rules) and (2) the incentives to repatriate foreign earnings, rather 
than to reinvest them locally, as a function of tax rates and foreign tax credit 
limitation status. 
As an aside here, another dimension that they might have considered is the 
importance of  alternative routes (from one controlled foreign corporation to 
another in different tax jurisdictions) through which repatriations can travel 
to  maximize  after-tax  repatriations.  Some of  the  accounting firms  have 
developed elaborate software to do just this. Price Waterhouse, for example, 
has a package that considers up to one hundred routes and allows as many as 
four intermediate countries to repatriate. 
In my remaining comments, I would like to embellish the HH framework 
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begin, HH develop the conventional wisdom that the deferral of U.S. tax on 
foreign subsidiary earnings of U.S. multinationals provides an incentive for 
the subsidiaries to postpone the payment of dividends to their U.S. parents. 
This is basically  correct in a wide variety  of circumstances, but not  in  all 
situations. 
For example,  HH interpret  Jun’s evidence (that a significant fraction of 
multinationals simultaneously receive dividends from their foreign subsidiar- 
ies as well  as make  new  capital  infusions) as being  inconsistent  with  tax 
minimization.  But  in  fact  the payment  of  dividends  can  be  a  tax-saving 
strategy in a number of  important situations. I will briefly list three cases 
here. 
First, it pays to repatriate, particularly from low-tax countries, when the 
parent’s marginal U.S.  tax rate is temporarily low. This may be the result of 
net operating losses for the parent; the add-on minimum tax prior to 1986, 
which dropped marginal tax rates from 46 to 39.1 percent; the alternative 
minimum  tax;  or  investment  tax  credit  carryforwards.’  With  a  little 
calculating,  table  5.6  of  the  paper  can  be  seen  as  providing  evidence 
consistent  with  an  incentive  to repatriate  when  the  parent  generates  net 
operating losses. Dividends paid to the U.S. by foreign subsidiaries in  1982 
were roughly the same as in  1980 despite a 25 percent reduction in foreign 
subsidiary earnings. And many firms faced net operating losses in 1982, as 
we know from the work of  Auerbach  and Poterba, among others, so firms 
apparently  seized this opportunity to repatriate  (see Auerbach  and Poterba 
A second situation in which it may pay to accelerate dividend payments is 
when a firm’s excess foreign tax credits are about to expire unused. In such 
a  circumstance,  it  may  pay  to  repatriate  profits  from  a  low-tax  foreign 
subsidiary to use up the credits, especially if  such profits would eventually 
be repatriated anyway. This ensures that the low-tax subsidiary profits will 
escape a repatriation tax. Note that it can be optimal to repatriate  from the 
low-tax country and turn around and make new capital infusions in the same 
firm, all purely for tax reasons. 
As  a  third  example,  if  repatriation  occurs  from  a  low-tax  foreign 
subsidiary  for  nontax  reasons  (such  as  the  existence  of  poor  investment 
opportunities), repatriations from a high-tax country can actually give rise to 
a net tax refund from the U.S. Treasury. That is, any firm in a deficit foreign 
tax credit position, repatriating  from a country where the tax rate exceeds 
that in the United States, will receive a foreign tax credit exceeding the U.S. 
tax on the repatriated dividend. 
Related  to  this  last point,  let me turn  next to the question of  the  “tax 
price”  of repatriation.  HH argue that the tax price of a repatriation  when a 
firm is in an excess foreign tax credit position is zero (or possibly positive if 
a  withholding  tax  must  be  incurred  to  effect  the  repatriation).  This 
observation  is reflected in the  design of  their Tobit model.  But this claim 
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ignores the possibility that excess foreign tax credits, which can be carried 
forward for  five  years,  might  actually get  used  to  offset  U.S. tax  in  the 
future. Setting the tax price of  a dividend repatriation to zero for an excess 
foreign tax credit firm is akin to arguing that the marginal tax rate of  a firm 
that  generates net  operating losses is 0 percent,  and this  can be  far from 
correct.  A  firm  with  an  excess  of  foreign  tax  credits naturally  becomes 
attracted to those investments in low-tax countries for which repatriation of 
profits is desirable for nontax reasons within a short period of  time.  Such 
considerations can make the tax price of  repatriation negative even where 
excess foreign tax credits exist. 
Another way  to use up excess foreign tax  credits not mentioned  in  the 
paper is to generate export sales from the United States rather than through a 
foreign subsidiary, branch, or even a so-called foreign sales corporation. In 
appropriate circumstances,  this  permits  half  the  profit  on  the  sale to  be 
allocated to “foreign-source  income,”  thereby allowing, in most cases, an 
additional foreign tax credit to be taken against U.S. tax liability equal to the 
U.S. tax rate on half the profit.’ 
A further complication that arises here is that a firm may face an excess 
foreign tax credit for one income basket but a deficit foreign tax credit for 
another. In this case, the tax price of repatriation can be positive for a firm 
reporting excess foreign tax credits. 
Trapped Equity 
As  suggested earlier, I was  a  bit  puzzled  by  the prominence given the 
trapped equity ideas in this paper. The trapped equity argument applies when 
retained earnings are trapped in the corporation and cannot be distributed in 
any  other  way  than  by  dividends.  Yet  a  major  theme  of  the  paper  is 
alternatives to dividends as a way to deliver retained earnings to the parent. 
There is one sense, though, in which the trapped equity argument does apply 
more  naturally  to  the  multinational  setting  than  to  the  domestic  one. 
Shoven’s evidence on share repurchases as a tax-favored way of distributing 
profits to shareholders is sufficient to cast serious doubt on the importance of 
the  trapped  equity  argument  in  the  United  States.  In  the  multinational 
context, however,  share repurchases and liquidations give rise to dividend 
treatment to the extent of  earnings and profits generated since 1962. As a 
related  matter,  such  transactions (i.e., share repurchases and  liquidations) 
should be counted as dividends for the purposes of  the HH study, but I do 
not believe that they were. 
Analysis of the Micro Data 
Let me turn next to what I find to be the most interesting part in the paper: 
the micro data for 1984 presented in tables 5.10-5.14.  First, consider table 
5.10. Let me begin with a minor quibble. HH indicate that, for firms paying 
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distributed was 65 percent of  after-tax earnings. While this is true, it can be 
misleading.  Interest,  rent,  and  royalties represent a distribution of  pretax 
earnings. Their payment triggers tax  in the United  States. More meaning- 
fully, these payments  represented less than  25 percent  of  taxable income 
before interest, rent, and royalties. 
Now  I  will  turn  to  more  important  matters.  Although  not  calculated 
directly in table 5.10, it is interesting to compare the average foreign tax rate 
paid  for  firms that  paid  dividends but  not  interest,  rent,  or royalties  (34 
percent) to those that paid interest, rent, or royalties but not dividends (51 
percent). For the most part, the benefits of tax deferral exist only in low-tax 
foreign subsidiary jurisdictions, as HH correctly point out. This, in turn, has 
implications for the optimal capital structure of  foreign subsidiaries. 
Because dividends can be delayed for many years but interest on debt, rent 
on lease contracts, and royalties on licensing agreements cannot be, equity 
financing  is  desirable  in  low-tax   environment^.^  Similarly,  in  high-tax 
environments, distributions from pretax income in a form that is deductible 
locally are tax preferred, so debt, leases, and licenses are desirable financing 
arrangements, although these benefits must be traded off against the cost of 
precommitment  to  the  timing  of  repatriation  that  is  not  present  with 
dividends. Because of  this, capital structure may well differ systematically 
across foreign subsidiaries as a function of their tax rates. 
In the Tobit model mn by  HH,  this possibility is  not  considered. Their 
dependent variable is dividends divided by total assets. The arguments I have 
just  made,  however,  suggest  that  the  ability  to  explain  cross-sectional 
variation in dividends as a function of the “tax price”  of paying them might 
be  improved if  dividends were deflated by  stockholders’ equity rather than 
total  assets to  control for capital  structure differences.  Despite this,  their 
results in table 5.14 fare pretty well on this score. 
One  final  comment  about  the  results  in  table  5.10  is  in  order.  In 
interpreting  the  finding  that  84  percent  of  foreign  subsidiaries  paid  no 
dividends in 1984, HH note that most controlled foreign corporations appear 
to generate no U.S.  tax  liability on their income each year. But, given an 
average foreign tax rate of  nearly 43 percent (and this is before withholding 
taxes on dividends), repatriations would hardly raise any U.S. tax anyway. 
I  will  skip  over  table  5.11  other  than  to  mention  in  passing  that  it 
constitutes good detective work to deal with the possible problem of foreign 
holding companies polluting  the results.  Moving on  to table  5.12, we  see 
that firms with deficit foreign tax credits account for 63 percent of  interest, 
rent,  and  royalty  repatriations.  HH  claim  that  this  is  consistent  with 
tax-minimizing behavior, but I cannot see why. Such repatriations are neutral 
relative to dividends for deficit foreign tax credit firms. Both can be shown 
to have a tax price equal to that given in equation (1) of  the paper. On the 
other hand, both are inferior to passive investment that generates Subpart F 
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As to passive income, table 5.12 also reveals that deficit foreign tax credit 
firms account for a disproportionate share of Subpart F income (58 vs. only 
52 percent of total assets). This is consistent with what HH expected to see, 
but what I find striking is that such a high proportion of Subpart F income is 
accounted for by  excess foreign tax credit firms. 
This points to a possible tax motivation for investing in Subpart F income 
that is not recognized in the paper. Firms with excess foreign tax credits and 
without  good  active  investment  opportunities  might  wish  to  postpone 
repatriations until they can average the large foreign tax credits with income 
from lower-tax-rate controlled foreign corporations. Another possibility is 
that, until the Tax Reform Act of  1986, the definition of earnings and profits 
differed for ordinary dividends and for Subpart F income. Since dividends 
are taxable only to the extent of  earnings and profits, repatriation by  way of 
Subpart F income can be preferred if  it results in a larger nontaxable return 
of capital than does a dividend repatriation. 
But table 5.12 reveals much more. With  some calculating, one can see 
that deficit foreign tax credit firms reporting Subpart F income generate an 
amount of  Subpart F  income equal to  7.15 percent of  total  assets. This 
suggests that a significant fraction of  total assets (probably well in excess of 
half)  is  invested  passively.  By  contrast,  excess  foreign  tax  credit  firms 
reporting Subpart F income generate total Subpart F income equal to only 
3.64 percent of total assets, suggesting a percentage investment in Subpart F 
assets of  perhaps half  as much. Note that Subpart F investment for deficit 
foreign tax credit firms is more desirable the lower is the average tax rate of 
the  foreign  subsidiary. In  this  regard,  some  calculating  from  table  5.12 
reveals  that  the  average  tax  rate  of  the  deficit  foreign  tax  credit  firms 
reporting Subpart F income is 21.8  percent, whereas those reporting no 
Subpart F income pay  average tax rates of 42.4 percent or nearly twice as 
much in  1984. At  this high rate, deferral is not particularly valuable. Table 
5.13 demonstrates this point even more vividly. 
Table  5.13 is interesting for another reason that is not  discussed in  the 
paper. It may be stretching things some, but table 5.13 can be interpreted as 
providing evidence that transfer pricing is being used to repatriate profits for 
controlled foreign corporations that face the highest tax rates. One would 
expect competition to result in  pretax rates of return on investment to be 
increasing in the level of tax rates across tax  jurisdiction^.^ Table 5.13 shows 
this to be the case except for the firms facing the highest tax rates. 
It would be interesting to compare the pretax return on asset numbers in 
table 5.13 with analogous numbers for excess foreign tax credit firms. Table 
5.13 reports data for deficit foreign tax credit firms only. The excess foreign 
tax credit firms have an even greater incentive to shift income via transfer 
pricing,  so  it  would  be  interesting to  see  whether  the  positive  relation 
between tax rates and pretax investment rates of  return turns negative for 
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Finally, I will comment briefly on the Tobit model of dividends reported in 
table 5.14. I like the results here, but a few qualifications are in order. I have 
already expressed my major experimental design regret, that the model does 
not control for expected capital structure differences across the subsidiaries. 
It also does not consider withholding taxes,  although this is acknowledged 
by  HH.  In  addition,  the model takes as exogenous factors that  are clearly 
endogenous, although the authors are well aware of  this as well. 
Although the  result  that  dividends  are  higher  where there  is an  excess 
foreign tax credit is sensible (and is consistent with my earlier argument that 
the  tax  cost of  a repatriation can be  negative  in  a present  value sense if 
foreign tax credits can be carried forward and used to offset U.S. taxes in the 
future),  it is also partially  induced by  construction.  If  dividends were  the 
only means to  effect repatriation,  a necessary condition for generating  an 
excess foreign tax credit would be to pay a dividend. 
Finally,  table 5.14  considers two dependent variables: dividends divided 
by  total assets and dividends plus Subpart F income divided by  total assets. 
HH  claim  that  the  results  are  similar  across  the  two  dependent  variable 
specifications,  suggesting  that  Subpart  F  income  responds  similarly  to 
dividend income with respect to the independent variables in the model. But 
this  seems  inconsistent  with  what  was  shown  in  tables  5.12  and  5.13. 
Indeed,  on closer inspection,  there is no inconsistency: Subpart F income 
does not seem to behave similarly to dividend income. In fact, the estimated 
coefficient on the foreign tax credit dummy drops 40 percent when Subpart F 
income is included in the dependent variable despite the fact that Subpart F 
income is less than 20 percent of dividends. And this makes sense: Subpart F 
income is desirable the lower the tax rate and hence the less likely it is that 
excess foreign tax credits are present.  Similarly, the coefficient on the tax 
cost  variable  declines  by  one-third,  which  is  consistent  with  the  earlier 
finding that Subpart F income is the preferred repatriation method when tax 
rates are lower abroad. 
To  conclude, Hines and Hubbard are to be greatly commended for a fine 
piece  of  work.  They have provided  the best  analysis of  microdata in  the 
multinational area that I have seen. Their effort deserves to be widely read, 
for it should stimulate much though on how taxes affect the flow of capital in 
an increasingly global economy. 
Notes 
1.  The presence of investment tax credit (ITC) carryforwards affects the marginal 
tax rate since the ability to utilize ITCs is tied directly to the regular tax. Each dollar 
of regular tax frees up some ITC carryforward. 
2.  On the other hand, up to 25 percent of  the profits from sales through a “foreign 
sales corporation”  may also give rise to “foreign-source  income.” 
3.  Two caveats are in order here.  First, withholding tax rates often differ among 
the repatriation alternatives, and this can affect the optional capital structure. Second, 207  Dividend Repatriations by U.S. Multinationals 
unlike equity financing, debt financing allows the possibility of repatriating principal 
without triggering a tax even when foreign “earnings  and profits”  are positive. 
4. For further elaboration of  this point, see Scholes and Wolfson (in press). 
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